


# Bray MCCANNALOK

SERIES 40/4X HIGH PERFORMANCE BUTTERFLY VALVES

## SAFETY MANUAL



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## 1.0 Introduction

This Safety Manual provides information necessary to design, install, verify and maintain a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) utilizing the Bray Series 40 / 4X McCannalok High Performance Butterfly Valve. This manual provides necessary requirements for meeting the IEC 61508 or IEC 61511 functional safety standards.

### 1.1 Terms and Abbreviations

**Safety** - Freedom from unacceptable risk of harm.

**Functional Safety** - The ability of a system to carry out the actions necessary to achieve or to maintain a defined safe state for the equipment / machinery / plant / apparatus under control of the system.

**Basic Safety** - The equipment must be designed and manufactured such that it protects against risk of damage to persons by electrical shock and other hazards and against resulting fire and explosion. The protection must be effective under all conditions of the nominal operation and under single fault condition.

**Safety Assessment** - The investigation to arrive at a judgment - based on evidence - of the safety achieved by safety-related systems.

**Fail-Safe State** - State where the valve actuator is de-energized and (if applicable with a spring-returned actuator) the springs are extended.

**Fail Safe** - Failure that causes the valve to go to the defined fail-safe state without a demand from the process.

**Fail Dangerous** - Failure that does not respond to a demand from the process (i.e. being unable to go to the defined fail-safe state).

**Fail Dangerous Undetected** - Failure that is dangerous and that is not being diagnosed by automatic stroke testing.

**Fail Dangerous Detected** - Failure that is dangerous but is detected by automatic stroke testing.

**Fail Annunciation Undetected** - Failure that does not cause a false trip or prevent the safety function but does cause loss of an automatic diagnostic and is not detected by another diagnostic.

**Fail Annunciation Detected** - Failure that does not cause a false trip or prevent the safety function but does cause loss of an automatic diagnostic or false diagnostic indication.

**Fail No Effect** - Failure of a component that is part of the safety function but that has no effect on the safety function.

**Low Demand Mode** - Mode, where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is no greater than twice the proof test frequency.

### 1.2 Acronyms

**FMEDA** - Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis.

**HFT** - Hardware Fault Tolerance.

**MOC** - Management of Change. These are specific procedures often done when performing any work activities in compliance with government regulatory authorities.

**PFDavg** - Average Probability of Failure on Demand.

**SFF** - Safe Failure Fraction, the fraction of the overall failure rate of a device that results in either a safe fault or a diagnosed unsafe fault.

**SIF** - Safety Instrumented Function, a set of equipment intended to reduce the risk due to a specific hazard (a safety loop).

**SIL** - Safety Integrity Level, discrete level (one out of a possible four) for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety functions to be allocated to the E/E/PE safety-related systems where Safety Integrity Level 4 has the highest level of safety integrity and Safety Integrity Level 1 has the lowest.

**SIS** - Safety Instrumented System – Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. An SIS is composed of any combination of sensor(s), logic solver(s), and final element(s).

### 1.3 Product Support

Product support can be obtained from:

Bray Controls Inc.  
13333 Westland Blvd. East  
Houston, TX, 77041, USA.  
Phone: 281 894 5454  
www.braycontrols.com

### 1.4 Related Literature

#### Hardware Documents:

- S40 / 4X McCannalok Product Brochure
- Installation, Operation and Maintenance Instructions
- Bray Technical Manual TM-1023

#### Guidelines/References:

- Safety Integrity Level Selection – Systematic Methods Including Layer of Protection Analysis, ISBN 1-55617-777-1, ISA
- Control System Safety Evaluation and Reliability, 2nd Edition, ISBN 1-55617-638-8, ISA
- Safety Instrumented Systems Verification, Practical Probabilistic Calculations, ISBN 1-55617-909-9, ISA

### 1.5 Reference Standards

#### Functional Safety:

- IEC 61508: 2000 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems
- ANSI/ISA 84.00.01-2004 (IEC 61511 Mod.) Functional Safety – Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector

## 2.0 Device Description

The Bray S40 / 4X McCannalok is a high performance quarter-turn butterfly valve used to control process fluids. It is offered in a standard version, and in a fire-safe version certified to API 607 Fifth Edition. The standard version is available in sizes from 2.5” through 60” in ASME pressure class 150; 2.5” through 54” in ASME class 300, and 2.5” through 30” in ASME class 600.

The Bray S 40 / 4X McCannalok product line includes all various pressure ratings and bodies styles such as S40 / 41 / 42 / 43 / 44 / 45 / 4A and 4B.

The firesafe version is available in 3” through 30” in ASME class 150, and in 3” through 24” in ASME class 300.

S40 / 4X McCannalok is offered in wafer or lug body configuration. It is designed in accordance with ASME standard B16.34, which meets international standards for pressure and temperature ratings, shell thickness, and bore diameters.

Installation details conform to the international flange standards ASME B16.5 and B16.47, ISO 7005, JIS B2238, and others. S40/4X McCannalok is provided with actuator/operator mounting details which conform to ISO 5211 standard.

The main components of the S40 / 4X McCannalok high performance butterfly valve are the body, disc, stem and seat. The assembly includes the seat retainer, stem journals, disc pins, stem packing set, packing gland, stem anti-blowout clips, and bottom body plug. The assembly is complemented with necessary gaskets, and hardware.

## 3.0 Designing a SIF Using A Manufactured Product

### 3.1 Safety Function

When de-energized, the S40 / S4X McCannalok valve moves to its fail-safe position. Depending on the version specified Fail – Closed or Fail - Open, the S40 McCannalok valve will rotate the valve disc to close off the flow path through the valve body or open the flow path through the valve body.

The S40 / 4X McCannalok valve is intended to be part of final element subsystem as defined per IEC 61508 and the achieved SIL level of the designed function must be verified by the designer.

### 3.2 Environmental limits

The designer of a SIF must check that the product is rated for use within the expected environmental limits. Refer to the Service data and Material sections of S40 / 4X McCannalok valve product catalogue for environmental limits.

### **3.3 Application limits**

The materials of construction of S40 / 4X McCannalok valve are specified in the Bray S40 /4X McCannalok valve product brochure. It is important that the designer check for material suitability considering on-site conditions and air supply conditions. If the S40 / 4X McCannalok valve is used outside of the application limits or with incompatible materials, the reliability data provided becomes invalid.

### **3.4 Design Verification**

A detailed Failure Mode, Effects, and Diagnostics Analysis (FMEDA) report is available from Bray Controls. This report details all failure rates and failure modes as well as the expected lifetime.

The achieved Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of an entire Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) design must be verified by the designer via a calculation of  $PFD_{avg}$  considering architecture, proof test interval, proof test effectiveness, any automatic diagnostics, average repair time and the specific failure rates of all products included in the SIF. Each subsystem must be checked to assure compliance with minimum hardware fault tolerance (HFT) requirements.

When using the S40 / 4X McCannalok valve in a redundant configuration, a common cause factor of at least 10% should be included in safety integrity calculations.

The failure rate data listed the FMEDA report is only valid for the useful life time of S40 / 4X McCannalok valve. The failure rates will increase sometime after this time period. Reliability calculations based on the data listed in the FMEDA report for mission times beyond the lifetime may yield results that are too optimistic, i.e. the calculated Safety Integrity Level will not be achieved.

### **3.5 SIL Capability**

#### **3.5.1 Systematic Integrity**

The product has met manufacturer design process requirements of Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 3. These are intended to achieve sufficient integrity against systematic errors of design by the manufacturer. A Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) designed with this product must not be used at a

SIL level higher than the statement without “prior use” justification by end user or diverse technology redundancy in the design.

#### **3.5.2 Random Integrity**

The S40/4X McCannalok valve is a Type A Device and is one of many components that can be used in a final element assembly.

The final element assembly consists of many components, i.e. S40 / S4X McCannalok valve, an actuator or operator, solenoid, quick exhaust valve, etc. and the SIL must be verified for the entire assembly using failure rates from all components. This analysis must account for any hardware fault tolerance and architecture constraints.

#### **3.5.3 Safety Parameters**

For detailed failure rate information refer to the Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis Report for the S40 / 4X McCannalok valve.

### **3.6 Connection of the S40 / 4X McCannalok valve to the SIS Logic-solver.**

The S40 / 4X McCannalok valve is connected to the safety rated logic solver which is actively performing the safety function as well as automatic diagnostics designed to diagnose potentially dangerous failures within the S40 / 4X McCannalok valve, (i.e. partial stroke test).

### **3.7 General Requirements**

The system’s response time shall be less than process safety time. The S40 / 4X McCannalok valve is only part of the final element of a SIS. All elements of the SIF must be chosen to meet the safety response time.

All SIS components, including the S40 / 4X McCannalok valve must be operational before process start-up.

User shall verify that the S40 / 4X McCannalok valve is suitable for use in safety applications by confirming the S40 / 4X McCannalok valve’s nameplate is properly marked.

Personnel performing maintenance and testing on S40 / 4X McCannalok valve shall be competent to do so.

Results from the proof tests shall be recorded and reviewed periodically.

The useful life of the S40 / 4X McCannalok valve is described in Section 5.4.

## **4.0 Installation And Commissioning**

### **4.1 Installation**

The S40 / 4X McCannalok valve must be installed per standard practices outlined in the Installation, Operation and Maintenance Instructions.

The environment must be checked to verify that environmental conditions do not exceed the ratings. The S40 / 4X McCannalok valve must be accessible for physical inspection.

### **4.2 Physical Location and Placement**

The S40 / 4X McCannalok valve shall be accessible with sufficient room for pneumatic connections and shall allow manual proof testing.

Pneumatic piping to the valve actuator shall be kept as short and straight as possible to minimize the

airflow restrictions and potential clogging. Long or kinked pneumatic tubes may also increase the valve closure time.

The S40 / 4X McCannalok valve shall be mounted in a low vibration environment. If excessive vibration can be expected special precautions shall be taken to ensure the integrity of pneumatic connectors to the valve actuator, or the vibration should be reduced using appropriate damping mounts.

### **4.3 Pneumatic Connections**

Recommended piping for the inlet and outlet pneumatic connections to the actuator of the S40 / 4X McCannalok valve is a minimum 1/4" metal or PVC tubing. The length of tubing between the actuator and the control device, such as a solenoid valve, shall be kept as short as possible and free of kinks. Only dry air filtered to 50 micron or better is recommended.

The process air pressure shall meet the requirements set forth in the Installation, Operation and Maintenance Instructions.

The process air capacity shall be sufficient to move the valve actuator within the required time.

## 5.0 Operation And Maintenance

### 5.1 Proof test without automatic testing

The objective of proof testing is to detect failures within the valve that are not detected by any automatic diagnostics of the system. Of main concern are undetected failures that prevent the safety instrumented function from performing its intended function.

The frequency of proof testing, or the proof test interval, is to be determined in reliability calculations for the safety instrumented functions for which a valve is applied. The

proof tests must be performed more frequently than or as frequently as specified in the calculation in order to maintain the required safety integrity of the safety instrumented function.

The following proof test is recommended. The results of the proof test should be recorded and any failures that are detected and that compromise functional safety should be reported to Bray Controls.

The suggested proof test consists of a full stroke of the S40 / 4X McCannalok valve's actuator.

**Table1: Recommended Proof Test**

Step	Action
1	Bypass the safety function and take appropriate action to avoid a false trip
2	Send a signal to the final element configuration to perform a full stroke and verify that this is achieved
3	Inspect the S40 / 4X McCannalok valve for any visible damage or contamination
4	Record any failures in your company's SIF inspection database
5	Remove the bypass and otherwise restore normal operation

The proof test coverage for the S40 / 4X McCannalok valve is listed in the FMEDA report.

The person(s) performing the proof test of S40 / S4X McCannalok valve should be trained in SIS operations, including bypass procedures, valve maintenance and company Management of Change procedures.

### 5.2 Proof test with automatic partial operational stroke testing

An automatic testing scheme that performs a full stroke of the S40 / 4X McCannalok valve and measures valve movement timing will detect most potentially dangerous failure modes. It is recommended that a physical inspection (Step 2 from Table 1) be performed on a periodic basis with the time interval determined by plant conditions. A maximum inspection interval of five years is recommended.

### 5.3 Repair and replacement

Repair procedures in the S40 / 4X McCannalok valve Installation, Operation and Maintenance manual must be followed.

### 5.4 Useful Life

The useful life of the S40 / 4X McCannalok valve is 10 to 15 years, or 10,000 cycles.

### 5.5 Manufacturer Notification

Any failures that are detected and that compromise functional safety should be reported to Bray Controls. Please contact Bray Controls customer service.

### 5.6 Product Registration

If the product is being used in a safety application and there is a desire to receive notices regarding the product, register the product with Bray Controls Customer Service.

## START-UP CHECKLIST

The following checklist may be used as a guide to employ the Bray S40 / 4X McCannalok valve in a safety critical SIF compliant to IEC 61508.

Activity	Result	Verified	
		By	Date
<b>Design</b>			
Target Safety Integrity Level and PFDavg determined			
Correct valve mode chosen (Fail-closed, Fail-open)			
Design decision documented			
Pneumatic compatibility and suitability verified			
SIS logic solver requirements for S40 / 4X McCannalok valve tests defined and documented			
Routing of pneumatic connections determined			
SIS logic solver requirements for partial stroke tests defined and documented			
Design formally reviewed and suitability formally assessed			
<b>Implementation</b>			
Physical location appropriate			
Pneumatic connections appropriate and according to applicable codes			
SIS logic solver valve actuation test implemented			
Maintenance instructions for proof test released			
Verification and test plan released			
Implementation formally reviewed and suitability formally assessed			
<b>Verification and Testing</b>			
Electrical connections verified and tested			
Pneumatic connection verified and tested			
SIS logic solver valve actuation test verified			
Safety loop function verified			
Safety loop timing measured			
Bypass function tested			
Verification and test results formally reviewed and suitability formally assessed			
<b>Maintenance</b>			
Tubing blockage / partial blockage tested			
Safety loop function tested			





# **Bray** CONTROLS

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